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Footnotes 
1. 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
2. Id. at 1612.
3. Id. at 1612-14.
4. Id. at 1614 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
5. Id. at 1615.
6. Id. at 1615 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41
(2000)).
7. Id. at 1614.
8. Id. at 1617, 1618-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1622; see also id. at 1623 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (asking whether
application of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cell phones
“would ‘untether the rule from the justifications underlying’” the
warrant exception (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343
(2009)).
Despite its relatively modest size, last Term’s SupremeCourt criminal docket packed a punch. The Courtdecided search-and-seizure issues important to day-to-
day policing, it returned to the Crawford v. Washington line of
cases, and several justices opined on the constitutionality of
solitary confinement and the death penalty. This article reviews
these and other criminal decisions with an eye toward issues
most relevant to state courts. It closes with a brief glance
toward the 2015 Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Traffic stops and administrative searches were the focus of
this Term’s Fourth Amendment cases. The Court issued impor-
tant rulings on “add-ons” to legitimate police stops, the rea-
sonableness of searches and seizures made pursuant to an offi-
cer’s mistake of law, and the constitutionality of city ordinances
permitting the police to inspect hotel registries without prior
permission from a judge.
TRAFFIC STOPS
Rodriguez v. United States1 is a simple but important case,
with significant implications for day-to-day policing. Rejecting
a “de minimis” add-on to a traffic stop to search for drugs, the
justices held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to
handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the
Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.”2
An officer stopped Rodriguez for a traffic infraction. After
checking his license and registration and conducting a brief
conversation, the officer issued a warning ticket. The officer
then asked for permission to walk his narcotics-detection dog
around the vehicle, but Rodriguez refused. The defendant
was held for another seven or eight minutes until another
officer arrived and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs in
the vehicle. A search turned up methamphetamine. The court
of appeals upheld the search, ruling that the delay was a de
minimis intrusion on the defendant’s liberty.3 The Court
reversed.
Writing for six justices, Justice Ginsburg stated the basic
principle that “[l]ike a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of
police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that war-
ranted the stop . . . and to attend to related safety concerns.”4
The Fourth Amendment may permit “certain unrelated checks
during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” but these may not pro-
long the stop “absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual.”5 A dog sniff is
“aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdo-
ing.’”6 Since it is not ordinarily part of a traffic stop, even a de
minimis increase in the length of detention to facilitate a dog
sniff is unlawful. The permissible duration of a traffic stop has
come to an end “when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—
or reasonably should have been—completed.”7 The majority
remanded for the court of appeals to determine if the officer
had reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez beyond the traf-
fic-stop investigation. 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, dis-
sented, finding that the overall length of the stop was rea-
sonable.  They also argued that the majority’s test will pro-
duce arbitrary results, as a rookie officer might reasonably
take longer to complete a traffic-stop investigation than a sea-
soned officer and that it will be difficult to determine which
activities are permissibly related to the objectives of a traffic
stop.8 Two of the dissenters also would have ruled that the
detention pending the dog sniff was justified by reasonable
suspicion.9
A few points are important to note, and it will be interest-
ing to see their treatment in the state courts and the lower fed-
eral courts. First, just as in Riley v. California (the recent cell-
phone-search blockbuster), the Court has again tightly “teth-
ered” the scope of a warrantless search or seizure to the pur-
poses for it.10 Here, even a de minimis prolongation of deten-
tion is not reasonable since it does not serve the purpose for
the stop. Second, the justices determined that the permissible
length of a stop may vary depending on the circumstances and
the purpose of the stop. The Court rejected a bright-line rule
proposed by Rodriguez, who had suggested that it was unrea-
sonable to hold him beyond the point where the officer actu-
ally issued the ticket warning.  A large part of the petitioner’s
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11. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (No. 13-9972) (Justice Sotomayor: “[B]ut
you’ve tied it to . . . just writing the ticket, which is crazy”); id. at
11 (Justice Alito: “If we hold that it’s okay to have a dog sniff so
long as it’s before the ticket is issued, then every police officer
other than those who are uninformed or incompetent will delay
the handing over of the ticket until the dog sniff is completed”);
id. at 12 (Justice Ginsburg: “[T]he easiest thing to get around . . .
would be the sequence in which . . . I won’t think of issuing the
ticket until I’ve had the dog sniff . . . .”).
12. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
13. Id. at 1615.
14. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
15. Id. at 534-35.
16. Id. at 536 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482
(2014)).
17. Id. at 536.
18. Id. at 540.
19. Id. at 540, 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 542, 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
22. The exclusionary-rule approach was taken in Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 144-46 (2009), and Davis v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011).
23. People v. Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 653-54 (Ill. 2015). See also State
v. Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, at ¶¶ 49-52 (Wis. 2015) (inter-
preting state and federal constitutions consistently and applying
Heien to overturn a recently decided case).
24. See, e.g., State v. Stadler, 2015 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 574 (Kan.
Ct. App. July 17, 2015) (possible mistake of law of trespass); State
v. Dopslaf, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 71 (N.M. Ct. App. June 24,
2015) (reasonable interpretation of traffic laws); and People v.
Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880 (N.Y. 2015) (reasonable interpretation of
laws relating to stop signs).
25. See People v. Jones, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2886, at *10
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015).
26. 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).
oral argument was consumed with whether such a bright line
would be workable or whether officers would simply delay
issuing a warning until after a dog sniff.11 The majority made
clear that “[t]he critical question . . . is not whether the dog
sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but
whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—
‘the stop’ . . . .”12 Third, there will be some sorting out of the
activities that are permissibly related to a traffic stop. Dog
sniffs are not included; they “[l]ack[] the same close connec-
tion to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries,” such as
checking the driver’s license, determining if there are out-
standing warrants, and inspecting the registration and proof
of insurance.13 But surely the law on this will develop over
time.
In another traffic-stop case, Heien v. North Carolina,14 the
Court found that a search or seizure made pursuant to a rea-
sonable mistake of law does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. In Heien, a sheriff’s officer pulled over a car for a broken
left brake light. After the driver and passenger gave consent to
search the vehicle, the deputy found a bag of cocaine. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the initial traffic
stop was invalid because, according to the state’s vehicle code,
driving with “a [single] stop lamp” was not a violation of law.15
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding the mis-
understanding of law to be reasonable, and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, mak-
ing clear that even if a police officer is mistaken about the law
justifying a search or seizure, that search or seizure does not
violate the Constitution if the mistake is reasonable. After all,
the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reason-
ableness.”16 The Court had already held that searches and
seizures based on mistakes of fact can provide reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause, and “[t]here is no reason . . . why
this same result” should not be acceptable “when reached by
way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.”17 The Court had
“little difficulty” concluding that the officer’s error of law was
reasonable based on a perceived ambiguity in the pertinent
statute.18 Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred
to emphasize that only “gen-
uinely ambiguous” statutes,
those requiring “hard inter-
pretive work”—as this one
did—can support a claim of
a reasonable mistake of law.19
The mistake must be objec-
tively reasonable; an officer’s subjective understanding of the
law is not relevant.20 Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing
that a “fixed legal yardstick”— the actual state of the law, not
just a reasonable understanding of it—should govern.21
The decision is significant in a number of respects. In
addition to the substantive holding itself, the majority
employed the mistake framework to determine that the
seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment at all, as
opposed to finding that there was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment but that the exclusionary rule should not
apply.22 This distinction proved important to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Illinois has sometimes interpreted the scope
of its exclusionary rule more broadly than the federal exclu-
sionary rule, but it generally construes the state constitution’s
“search and seizure” phrase consistent with that of the fed-
eral constitution. Following Heien, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that a mistaken belief about the legality of a
trailer hitch did not make a stop unreasonable under either
the state or federal constitutions.23 A number of state courts
have already applied Heien to uphold seizures based upon
reasonable mistakes of law in a variety of settings.24 However,
not every mistake will do. At least one court has found that
an officer’s mistake of law was unreasonable where the state
courts had already clearly construed the meaning of the rele-
vant statute.25
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
City of Los Angeles v. Patel26 provided a significant victory
for hotel operators and their guests, but it may have repercus-
sions for more than 100 municipalities across the country. A
provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code compels hotel
operators to obtain and record specified information about





27. This includes the guest’s name and address, the size of each guest’s
party, any guest vehicles, date and time of arrival and departure,
assigned room number, rate charged, and method of payment. Id.
at 2447-48. There are more than 100 similar laws in cities and
counties across the nation. Id. at 2457, 2460 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
28. Id. at 2452.
29. Id. at 2453, 2456.
30. Id. at 2453.
31. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, authored a separate dis-
sent arguing that the ordinance was not facially unconstitutional.
Id. at 2464 (Alito, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2457, 2461 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam).
34. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
35. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
36. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370.
37. Id. at 1371.
38. 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
39. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
40. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
41. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
42. Id. at 2179-80 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006)).
43. Davis, supra note 42.
44. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
45. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
46. Davis, supra note 42.
47. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
their guests.27 It also requires
hotels to make guest records
available to officers for inspec-
tion upon request. A group of
motel operators sued, alleging
the provision was facially
unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court agreed in an opinion by
Justice Sotomayor.
The case involved a facial
challenge to the code provision.
The municipal ordinance vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment
because it failed to provide hotel operators with an opportu-
nity for precompliance review before a neutral decision maker.
Admittedly, because the searches at issue served a special need
beyond conducting criminal investigations, namely, ensuring
compliance with the recordkeeping requirement (which in
turn deterred criminal enterprises on hotel premises), they fell
beyond the ambit of the warrant requirement.28 Nonetheless,
such administrative searches still require the opportunity for
precompliance review. The ability to search without precom-
pliance review was not necessary to the regulatory scheme, and
the inspection scheme at issue did not provide an adequate
substitute for a warrant.29 The Court suggested that searches
utilizing administrative subpoenas would be constitutional
since an objecting hotel operator could move to quash the sub-
poena before any search takes place.30 Justice Scalia authored
the main dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas.31 He argued that the searches were necessary to deter
criminal activity in motels, “obvious havens for those who
trade in human misery.”32 Because hotels are closely regulated
industries subject to stricter government regulation, warrant-
less searches are not unreasonable. 
The Term also included a per curiam reversal involving a
civil search. The petitioner in Grady v. North Carolina33 was a
recidivist sex offender whom the State sought to subject to
satellite-based monitoring under a civil statute. Grady claimed
that ordering him to wear a monitoring device and continu-
ously tracking his movements would be an unreasonable
search. The North Carolina courts rejected his challenge on the
theory that civil monitoring is distinguishable from searches in
criminal cases such as United States v. Jones.34 The justices
granted Grady’s petition for a writ of certiorari and summarily
reversed. In light of Jones and Florida v. Jardines,35 a state “con-
ducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body,
without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s
movements.”36 The civil-criminal distinction was immaterial,
since the Fourth Amendment extends beyond criminal inves-
tigations. “[T]he government’s purpose in collecting informa-
tion does not control whether the method of collection consti-
tutes a search.”37 The Justices remanded for the state courts to
determine whether the monitoring program is reasonable
when it is properly viewed as a search.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Court’s sole Sixth Amendment decision, Ohio v. Clark,38
is the latest in the Crawford v. Washington39 line of cases. While
the holding may appear uncontroversial, the decision further
revealed the rift among the justices regarding their fealty to
Crawford.
Crawford, of course, rejected the approach to the Con-
frontation Clause marked by Ohio v. Roberts, under which
hearsay statements against a criminal defendant were admis-
sible if the statements bore “adequate indicia of reliability.”40
Crawford instead “prohibits the introduction of testimonial
statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is
‘unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior oppor-
tunity for cross-examination.’”41 Statements “are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
. . . ongoing emergency” and that “the primary purpose” is
“to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.”42 Applying the “primary purpose”
test, the Supreme Court has found the following to be non-
testimonial: calls to a 911 operator,43 a dying victim’s identi-
fication of his shooter (who was still on the loose),44 and a
lab report arguably not offered for its truth.45 Statements
deemed testimonial include descriptions of spousal abuse
provided to police46 and reports from forensic analysts.47 In
Clark, the Supreme Court applied the “primary purpose” test
to statements made by three-year-old “L.P.” to preschool
teachers. L.P. appeared at school with injuries that suggested
child abuse. He told teachers that his mother’s boyfriend had
caused the injuries. At trial, the state introduced L.P.’s state-
ments to his teachers; L.P. did not testify. Though the justices
split on their reasoning and language, the Court unanimously










48. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181-83.
49. Id. at 2183, 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 2185, 2186 (Thomas, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2185. Justice Scalia argues that “[t]his dictum gets the bur-
den precisely backwards . . . . The burden is on the prosecutor
who seeks to introduce evidence over this [Confrontation Clause]
bar to prove a long-established practice of introducing specific
kinds of evidence . . . .” Id.
54. Decisions appear simply to cite Clark as the latest Crawford case.
See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 791 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir.
2015) (admission of a young child’s spontaneous statements to
her mother’s boyfriend was not testimonial); People v. Hinton,
2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6097, at *23 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
24, 2015) (in-custody defendant’s inculpatory statements during a
recorded phone call were nontestimonial); and Holloman v. Com-
monwealth, 775 S.E.2d 434, 446 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (a gang note-
book was not created for the purposes of an investigation or pros-
ecution).
55. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
56. 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 61-62.
58. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734-35.
59. Id. at 2737.
60. Id. at 2738-39, 2741-42.
61. Id. at 2780, 2785-86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan).
62. Id. at 2795.
ruled that admitting the statements did not violate the Con-
frontation Clause. 
Justice Alito wrote for the Court. Applying Crawford and its
progeny, the justices found that L.P.’s statements occurred in
the context of an ongoing emergency. Because there was no
indication that the primary purpose of the conversation
between L.P. and his teachers was to gather evidence for Clark’s
prosecution, the admission of testimony about L.P.’s out-of-
court statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause even
though the teachers were subject to mandatory reporting
requirements.48 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, con-
curred, emphasizing that the statements were non-testimonial
under the precedent applicable to informal police interroga-
tion.49 Justice Thomas was of the view that the child’s state-
ments did not “bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to qualify as
testimonial.”50
While at first blush this case appears uncontroversial, Jus-
tice Scalia had harsh words for the majority. He wrote sepa-
rately to “protest the Court’s shoveling of fresh dirt upon the
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so recently rescued
from the grave in Crawford v. Washington.”51 Justice Scalia
took issue with the majority’s characterization of Crawford as
merely a “different approach” from Ohio v. Roberts, and he
assailed Justice Alito for his “hostility to Crawford and its prog-
eny.”52 More substantively, Justice Scalia criticized the majority
for what he took as dictum suggesting that defendants must
show that the evidence would have been excluded in criminal
cases at the time of the founding. If true, that would signal a
significant retreat from Crawford,53 though subsequent courts
do not appear to read the case that way.54
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In Glossip v. Gross,55 the only Eighth Amendment case
decided last Term, the Court held that midazolam—a contro-
versial drug used to render prisoners unconscious as part of
Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol—worked adequately
enough to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny. In doing so,
the Court affirmed a test used by a plurality of the Court in a
previous method-of-execution case, Baze v. Rees.56
When Oklahoma adopted lethal injection as its chosen form
of capital punishment, the state settled on a three-drug proto-
col that included sodium thiopental, a chemical that produces
unconsciousness during an execution. In Baze, the Court
upheld Kentucky’s use of this
same three-drug protocol,
rejecting a challenge by
inmates who claimed that the
risk of a botched execution was
so great that it effectively
amounted to the infliction of
cruel and unusual punish-
ment.57 After Baze, Oklahoma
was unable to secure this and
another barbiturate, so it
turned to midazolam, a seda-
tive it had not used before, to
render prisoners unconscious during lethal injection. The
plaintiffs in Glossip brought a federal civil-rights action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s midazolam execu-
tion protocol following the state’s botched execution of another
inmate, Clayton Lockett.58
Justice Alito, writing for a five-justice majority, determined
that Oklahoma’s new drug protocol did not amount to an
unconstitutional infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
Drawing upon the test from the Baze plurality opinion, the
Court concluded that to obtain a preliminary injunction, pris-
oners must show “a likelihood that they can establish both that
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated
risk of severe pain and that the risk is substantial when com-
pared to the known and available alternatives.”59 Here, their
claims failed both requirements—petitioners did not establish
that the district court committed clear error in finding mida-
zolam would not inflict severe pain and suffering, nor could
they suggest an alternative method of execution.60
Justice Sotomayor penned the principal dissent, arguing
that Oklahoma’s use of midazolam violated the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
because the drug could not be trusted to render and keep an
inmate insensate, leaving him vulnerable to pain at the later
stages of the execution.61 She was particularly critical of the
majority’s requirement that the inmates identify an alternative
method of execution; she would have held that the State
should not be allowed to use an objectively intolerable method
simply because an alternative cannot be identified.62
Justice Breyer authored another dissent, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, suggesting that the death penalty was per se unconsti-
Court Review - Volume 51 141









63. Id. at 2755, 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Glossip petitioners
subsequently petitioned the Court for a rehearing of their case
based on Justice Breyer’s dissent. The Court denied their petition.
Glossip v. Gross, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4626, 84 U.S.L.W. 3099 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 2015). 
64. See id. at 2746, 2750 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Justice
Thomas) (“By arrogating to himself the power to overturn [the
Framers’] decision, Justice Breyer does not just reject the death
penalty, he rejects the Enlightenment.”); id. at 2750, 2752
(Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Justice Scalia) (attacking Justice
Breyer’s arguments as “based on cardboard stereotypes or cold
mathematical calculations”).
65. Manny Fernandez, Delays as Death-Penalty States Scramble for Exe-
cution Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2015, http://www.ny
times.com/2015/10/09/us/death-penalty-lethal-injection.html. 
66. Joint Stipulation for Administrative Closing of Case, Glossip v. Gross
(Oct. 16, 2015) (No. CIV-14-665-F), http://www.ok.gov/ oag/docu-
ments/Glossip%20-%20Joint%20Stipulation.pdf; see also Amanda
Sakuma, Oklahoma Won’t Be Executing Death Row Inmates Anytime
Soon, MSNBC, Oct. 16, 2015, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/
oklahoma-wont-be-executing-death-row-inmates-anytime-soon.
67. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
69. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (clause covers
Florida’s crime of attempted burglary); Sykes v. United States, 564
U.S. 1 (2011) (clause covers Indiana’s crime of vehicular flight
from a law-enforcement officer); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.
137 (2008) (clause does not cover New Mexico’s crime of driving
under the influence); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122
(2009) (clause does not cover Illinois’s crime of failure to report
to a penal institution).
70. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
71. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 141).
72. Id. at 2557-58. 
73. Id. at 2558 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81, 91 (1921)).
74. Id. at 2563.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2557.
77. Id. at 2563 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2563 (Thomas, J., con-
curring). Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy opinion addressing the
Due Process Clause and the vagueness doctrine.
tutional and inviting full brief-
ing on the issue.63 His lengthy
dissent points to issues of lack
of reliability in assessing
whether death is the appropri-
ate punishment, arbitrariness
in application of the sanction,
and delays in the process. This
drew sharp separate opinions
from Justices Scalia and
Thomas, attacking the sugges-
tion that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se.64
And in a final twist, after
discovering that it was about
to use the wrong drug to induce cardiac arrest, the State of
Oklahoma halted Richard Glossip’s execution two hours before
it was scheduled to occur.65 Since then, the State has reached
an agreement with death-row inmates that will effectively pro-
hibit any executions until later in 2016.66
DUE PROCESS & EQUAL PROTECTION
Last Term saw the justices give up on efforts to interpret a
federal statute, finding the statute vague. The Court also gave
us a ruling about harmless error in the context of jury selection.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE—VAGUENESS
The Court granted certiorari in Johnson v. United States67 to
decide whether unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun
is a “violent felony” under the federal Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which makes a defendant pre-
viously convicted of violent felonies eligible for an increased
sentence. Johnson was the Court’s fifth go since 2007 at the
“residual clause” of the act that purports to define certain vio-
lent felonies. After oral argument in November 2014, the jus-
tices called for supplemental briefing and heard re-argument in
April 2015. Then they threw in the towel, finding that this
“residual clause” of the ACCA violates the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague. 
The ACCA defines “violent felony” in several ways. It could
be a crime that involves the “use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force” against another; it could be burglary,
arson, extortion, or an offense involving use of explosives; or
it could be an offense that “otherwise involves conduct that pre-
sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”68 The
italicized phrase has come to be known as the “residual
clause,” and the prosecution sought to qualify Johnson’s prior
conviction under this provision. In four cases decided since
2007, the justices have interpreted the residual clause of the
ACCA without striking it down.69 In those decisions, the
Court applied Taylor v. United States,70 which explained that
whether a crime is a violent felony under the ACCA requires a
categorical approach; that is, assessing “how the law defines
the offense” and “not . . . how an individual offender might
have committed it on a particular occasion.”71
The opinion of the Court in Johnson, written by Justice Scalia
and joined by five other justices, concludes that there is too
much uncertainty in categorically determining what kind of
conduct “the ordinary case” involves, as well as “how much
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.”72 In one
prior case, the Court had assessed risk by comparison to the
closest analog among the enumerated crimes in the ACCA; two
of the prior cases sought to rely upon statistics; and a fourth
took an entirely different approach. This “failure of ‘persistent
efforts . . . to establish a standard’” confirms that the statute is
vague.73 Stare decisis, the majority says, “does not matter for its
own sake” but only to promote the consistency and pre-
dictability of the law.74 Because application of the residual
clause has proved to be unworkable, standing by precedent
would “undermine . . . the goals that stare decisis is meant to
serve.”75 The residual clause “denies fair notice to defendants
and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.”76 Justices
Kennedy and Thomas concurred; they would have found that
the offense was not a violent felony under the prior court rul-
ings, and they would not have struck down the residual
clause.77 Justice Alito dissented, finding no good reason for
142 Court Review - Volume 51  










overruling precedent “except the Court’s weariness with ACCA
cases.”78 Justice Alito also would have upheld the residual
clause, primarily on the theory that the ACCA does not refer to
“the ordinary case” and whether the clause applies or not can
be determined by looking at the specific circumstances of each
crime.79
A few points to note. First, the Court struck down only the
residual clause, not the other parts of the ACCA (including the
provision with enumerated offenses). Thus, the holding need
not relate to similar statutes with enumerated offenses. Second,
the Court itself emphasized that its holding does not automat-
ically apply to the “dozens of federal and state criminal laws”
that include terminology such as “substantial risk,” “grave
risk,” and “unreasonable risk,” since almost none of these
other laws link the phrase to a confusing list of examples, as
opposed to conduct on a particular occasion.80 The impact of
Johnson remains to be seen. This decision may open, or at least
push slightly ajar, a door to constitutional challenges to state
laws that contain at least some language similar to that of the
residual clause.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE—BATSON
The Term also delivered a Batson81 case, Davis v. Ayala,82
though it was presented in a complicated federal habeas corpus
framework. In Davis, the Court considered whether a federal
habeas petitioner with Batson claims was entitled to relief
when the state court determined that even though there was
probably error in his case, it was harmless. A closely divided
Court concluded that because the state court was statutorily
entitled to deference, and because its findings were reasonable,
the federal habeas petition should be denied.83
During jury selection in Ayala’s case, the prosecution used
its peremptory challenges to exclude 18 prospective jurors,
including all 7 African-Americans and Hispanics in the venire.
The defense raised Batson objections three times. While the
trial court required the prosecution each time to provide its
reasons for the strikes, the judge allowed the prosecution to
offer its justifications ex parte so as not to be forced to reveal
trial strategy. Each time the trial court found that the prosecu-
tion had sufficient race-neutral reasons to exclude those jurors.
Ayala was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.84
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that excluding
defense counsel was error under state and possibly federal law
but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ayala sought federal habeas corpus relief, which the court of
appeals determined should be granted.85 The Supreme Court
reversed, 5-4. 
In an opinion authored by
Justice Alito, the Court first dis-
cussed the habeas framework.
Under Brecht v. Abrahamson,86 a
petitioner must show that a trial
error resulted in actual preju-
dice, and this test subsumes the
demanding standards of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, when the state
court has found an error to be
harmless.87 Applying this defer-
ential framework, the majority reviewed the prosecution’s
explanations for its peremptory challenges. There was suffi-
cient information in the record for the trial court to rule on
the Batson objections without the defense present.88 “Ayala
cannot establish actual prejudice or that no fair-minded jurist
could agree with the state court’s application” of the test for
harmless error.89
The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer, expressed no disagree-
ment with the standard of review described by the majority but
contended that its analysis misidentified the issue: the major-
ity focused on whether the trial court was wrong to reject
Ayala’s Batson objections based on the record rather than on
the exclusion of his attorneys from the Batson hearings.90
Ayala’s lawyers could have played two critical roles had they
been present at the Batson hearings. First, they would have
been able to question the credibility of the offered race-neutral
explanations. Second, they could have made a record and
ensured that the trial judge actually considered the defense
arguments against the offered reasons. Counsel’s presence was
all the more important given the length of the jury-selection
process (3 months) and the apparent loss of the majority of the
jurors’ questionnaires.91 And, with respect to one of the chal-
lenged jurors, the dissenters concluded that “had Ayala’s
lawyers been present at the Batson hearing” to point out simi-
larities between that juror and a white juror who was not
struck, it is probable that “his strong Batson claim would have
turned out to be a winning one.”92 There were also two inter-
esting concurrences. Justice Kennedy joined the majority but
expressed his grave concern that Ayala has apparently been in
solitary confinement for more than 25 years.93 Justice Thomas
retorted that “the accommodations in which Ayala is housed
are a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims 
. . . now rest.”94
78. Id. at 2573, 2575 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
79. Id. at 2578-80.
80. Id. at 2561.
81. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
82. 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015).
83. Id. at 2208.
84. Id. at 2193-95.
85. Id. at 2195-97.
86. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
87. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
88. For example, counsel’s presence was not necessary for the trial
judge to compare answers of white and African-American jurors
(id. at 2201), to assess the prosecutor’s concern about a juror’s lim-
ited English proficiency (id. at 2204), or to evaluate the sincerity
of a prosecutor’s concern about a juror’s willingness to impose the
death penalty (id. at 2205).
89. Id. at 2203.
90. Id. at 2210, 2211-12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2212-13.
92. Id. at 2215-16.
93. Id. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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cases of this Term involved
interpreting a wide array of
criminal statutes. We will
review two decisions in which
the Court assessed scienter
requirements, two others with
ambiguous statutory terms,
and an opinion addressing
whether a felon whose
firearms are seized can trans-
fer those firearms to another.
Additionally, we venture per-
haps slightly outside of our
charter to summarize an
important civil decision interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) and the use of evidence to impeach a jury’s verdict. 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW—MENTAL STATE
In Elonis v. United States,95 sometimes called the “Facebook
threats” case, the Court read a scienter requirement into a fed-
eral criminal statute but did not specify the particular state of
mind required for conviction or reach the lurking constitu-
tional question. Anthony Elonis posted violent, graphic, and
self-made rap lyrics on Facebook that referenced his estranged
wife, co-workers, an unspecified kindergarten class, and an
FBI agent. While Elonis often posted the material with dis-
claimers that his lyrics were fictitious, others viewed them dif-
ferently. Elonis was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),
which prohibits transmitting in interstate commerce “any
communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person
of another.” The district court denied Elonis’s request for a jury
instruction that the government must prove that he intended
to communicate a true threat, and it instead instructed the jury
that it was enough if he intentionally made a statement that a
reasonable person would view as a threat.96 Elonis was con-
victed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed.
As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the Court, the text
of § 875(c) did not specify any particular mental-state require-
ment.97 The majority turned to Morissette v. United States98 and
other precedents for the general rule that a defendant must be
“blameworthy in mind” and that criminal statutes will be
interpreted to include “broadly applicable scienter require-
ments” even if the statute does not contain them.99 When the
statute is silent on the required mental state, the Court will
“read into the statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary to
separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent con-
duct.’”100 Because the “crucial element separating legal inno-
cence from wrongful conduct” was the threatening nature of
the communication, the lower courts erred in ruling that crim-
inal liability depended on how Elonis’s posts were understood
by a reasonable person, as opposed to what Elonis thought.
Negligence, the Court held, was not enough.101 However, the
justices declined to decide whether recklessness would suffice
and remanded to the lower courts to decide the issue.102
This refusal to decide the requisite mental state led Justice
Alito to write separately. While Justice Alito concurred that sci-
enter was required, he would have found that recklessness in
making threatening statements was enough.103 Because he also
would have upheld the conviction on a standard of reckless-
ness, Justice Alito also reached the First Amendment issue,
finding that the Free Speech Clause did not protect Elonis’s
Facebook posts.104 Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter and,
like Justice Alito, castigated the Court for “throw[ing] every-
one from appellate judges to everyday Facebook users into a
state of uncertainty.”105 He would have upheld a general-intent
approach and found no First Amendment violation.106
In the other scienter case of the Term, McFadden v. United
States,107 the Court unanimously held that the government can
establish that a defendant “knowingly” distributed a controlled
substance “analogue” in two ways: (1) proving that a defen-
dant knew that he was dealing with a controlled substance or
something treated as a controlled substance under the Ana-
logue Act, 21 U.S.C. § 813; or (2) proving that a defendant
knew the specific analogue he was dealing with, even if he did
not know its legal status as an analogue.108 McFadden sold hal-
lucinogenic bath salts. Because the lower court found that the
statute only required that the government prove he meant for
the substance to be consumed by humans, the Court vacated
and remanded for further proceedings. McFadden and Elonis
together afford some guidance in assessing mens rea require-
ments in statutes that either have no explicit scienter require-
ment (Elonis) or have a requirement that must be distributed
to the statute’s other elements (McFadden).
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW—AMBIGUOUS STATUTES
Yates v. United States,109 one of the decisions construing
ambiguous statutes, was not the most important case of the
Term, but it is tough to beat for amusement value. The ques-
tion was whether a fisherman who threw undersized fish from
his boat destroyed “tangible object[s]” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519, the “anti-shredding” provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in the wake of Enron’s
95. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
96. 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
97. Id. at 2008.
98. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
99. 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (quoting Morisette, supra note 98, and United
States v. X–Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994)).
100. Id. at 2010 (quotations omitted).
101. Id. at 2011-12.
102. Id. at 2013.
103. Id. at 2013, 2014-16 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
104. Id. at 2016-17.
105. Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2021, 2028.
107. 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015).
108. Id. at 2305.
109. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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statute but did 







accounting fraud and revelations that Arthur Andersen had
destroyed potentially incriminating documents.
The facts of this case seem made to amuse first-year law stu-
dents.110 A fish-and-game officer boarded the Miss Katie, a
commercial fishing vessel captained by defendant John Yates.
Federal regulations at the time required immediate release of
grouper less than 20 inches long, and the officer found 72 fish
that fell short of that mark. He separated the undersized fish
from the rest of the catch and ordered Yates to leave them
undisturbed until the Miss Katie returned to port. But when the
officer visited the boat several days later, he discovered that
Yates had ordered a crew member to throw the undersized fish
over the side and replace them with slightly larger denizens of
the deep. Yates was subsequently charged with the federal
crime of destroying “any record, document or tangible object
with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal
investigation. He was convicted following a jury trial, and the
court of appeals affirmed his conviction. A bare majority of the
Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a plurality opinion in which three
other justices joined, finding that the lower courts applied too
broad a definition of “tangible object.” Justice Alito concurred,
providing the fifth vote for reversal. The plurality looked to the
context of Sarbanes-Oxley, which was enacted specifically to
“prohibit . . . corporate document-shredding to hide evidence
of financial wrongdoing.”111 While the justices acknowledged
that the ordinary meaning of “tangible object” could encom-
pass anything with discrete form, the plurality found that the
specific context for the disputed language, the broader context
of the statute, and principles of statutory construction (such as
avoiding a reading that would render parts of the statute super-
fluous) counseled a narrower construction. “It is highly
improbable that Congress would have buried a general spolia-
tion statute covering objects of any and every kind in a provi-
sion targeting fraud in financial record-keeping.”112 Thus,
“tangible object” should be read “to cover only objects one can
use to record or preserve information, not all objects in the
physical world.”113 Concurring, Justice Alito offered a similar
but not identical definition of “tangible object,” concluding
that the term “should refer to something similar to records or
documents.”114
The dissent, penned by Justice Kagan, took issue with how
both the Ginsburg plurality and the Alito concurrence inter-
preted section 1519. While the dissenting justices agreed “that
context matters in interpreting statutes,” they argued that the
plain text of the statute and the context surrounding its enact-
ment both pointed to a broad
reading of “tangible object.”115
The dissent suggested that the
majority reached its decision
because of “overcriminalization
and excessive punishments in
the U.S. Code.”116 Although Jus-
tice Kagan agreed that section
1519 grants “prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers
too much discretion” and reflects “a deeper pathology in the
federal criminal code,” it is not up to the Court to reconstruct
laws written by Congress.117
The other case with ambiguous statutory terms is Whitfield
v. United States.118 There a unanimous Court ruled that the
statute enhancing penalties for bank robberies that involve
forced “accompaniment” does not require movement over a
substantial distance; the forced-accompaniment provision of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) applies even if the movement occurs
entirely within a single building or over a short distance. The
Court looked to the dictionary definition of “accompany” and
noted that the danger involved in forced accompaniment does
not depend on the distance traveled.119
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW—TRANSFER OF SEIZED
FIREARMS
Another interesting federal criminal case is Henderson v.
United States.120 There a unanimous Court held that a con-
victed felon whose firearms are seized by the government
before his conviction can transfer those firearms to a seller or
other third party unless doing so would allow him to later
retake control over those firearms and either use them or direct
their use.121 The decision interprets the federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), that bars felons from possessing firearms.
While the Court did not decide any constitutional claims, the
opinion may be worth a read given the prevalence of felon-in-
possession statutes among the states. 
The opinion begins by describing “the proverbial sticks
from the bundle of property rights” that Henderson retained
over his firearms despite his conviction.122 The Court
explained that upon conviction, Henderson had lost the stick
of possession, which encompasses both actual and construc-
tive possession, and that he would still constructively possess
the firearms if they were transferred to anyone who would
return them to Henderson or follow his instructions for their
use. But the Court separated that from the right to sell or oth-
erwise dispose of his firearms, which Henderson retained
110. And Supreme Court justices as well. See id. at 1091 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (referencing Dr. Seuss, One Fish Two Fish Red Fish
Blue Fish (1960)); id. at 1094 (arguing that the plurality’s “fish-
ing expedition comes up empty”).
111. Id. at 1081 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tices Breyer and Sotomayor).
112. Id. at 1087. 
113. Id. at 1081.
114. Id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring). He concluded that the combi-
nation of “the statute’s list of nouns, list of verbs, and its title”
suggested that Congress intended the statute to apply to a spe-
cific category of items, asking—for example—“[h]ow does one
make a false entry in a fish?” Id. at 1089-90. 
115. Id. at 1090, 1092 (Kagan, J., joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas).
116. Id. at 1100.
117. Id. at 1101.
118. 135 S. Ct. 785 (2015).
119. Id. at 789.
120. 135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015).
121. Id. at 1783.
122. Id. at 1784.
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132. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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138. Id. at 2479. 
139. 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
despite his conviction.123 What
matters is whether the felon
exercises any control over the
firearms after the transfer, so “a
court . . . may approve the
transfer of guns consistently
with § 922(g) if, but only if,
that disposition prevents the
felon from later exercising con-
trol over those weapons, so that
he could either use them or tell
someone else how to do so.”124
EVIDENCE—IMPEACHING A
VERDICT
The Court also decided a
civil case about impeaching a
jury’s verdict. The opinion con-
strues Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and may be of particu-
lar interest in jurisdictions with evidence codes similar to the
Federal Rules. 
In Warger v. Shauers,125 the plaintiff moved for a new trial
after one juror gave an affidavit about statements made by
another juror that suggested she had lied during voir dire. The
Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence precluded the
district court from considering the affidavit; the opinion artic-
ulates a strong version of the common-law anti-impeachment
rule.
The decision construes Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
which provides that a juror may not testify about any state-
ment made in deliberations as part of “an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict.” A claim about misconduct during voir
dire plainly entails an inquiry into the validity of a verdict
regardless of whether the misconduct had a direct effect on the
verdict.126 The Court acknowledged that some jurisdictions
have a weak anti-impeachment rule. For example, under what
is sometimes known as the “Iowa” approach, jury testimony is
only excluded when it relates to matters that “inhered in the
verdict,” and that approach has been used to allow juror testi-
mony challenging conduct during voir dire.127 However, as Jus-
tice Sotomayor wrote for a unanimous Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the “Iowa” approach early on, and the plain lan-
guage of Rule 606(b) is consistent with these early cases.128
The Court also turned aside the plaintiff’s contentions that the
exceptions in Rule 606(b) applied here and that the narrow
interpretation of the rule unconstitutionally infringed the right
to an impartial jury.129
CIVIL RIGHTS
There were several substantial civil-rights cases in the last
Term. One decided the standard to apply in excessive-force
lawsuits; others addressed the doctrine of qualified immunity.
In the most significant of the cases, Kingsley v. Henderson,130
the Court held that to prove an excessive-force claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a pretrial detainee only has to show that officers
purposefully or knowingly used force that was objectively
excessive, not that the officers were subjectively aware that
their use of force was unreasonable.131 Justice Breyer, writing
for the majority, explained that the objective standard was con-
sistent with precedent, primarily Bell v. Wolfish,132 where the
Court held that pretrial detainees cannot constitutionally be
subjected to excessive force that amounts to punishment.
According to the majority, under Bell, a pretrial detainee can
prevail on an excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
even when there is no evidence of the officers’ intent to pun-
ish. He only has to show that the officers’ actions are not
“rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose” or that those actions exceed what is necessary for
that purpose.133 Second, the objective standard is “workable”;
that is, there are pattern jury instructions in several circuits
that incorporate that standard, and many officers are trained
“to interact with all detainees as if [their] conduct is subject to
an objective reasonableness standard.”134 Finally, the objective
standard “adequately protects an officer who acts in good
faith,” because the reasonableness of force is determined “from
the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant offi-
cer.”135 The majority expressly declined to reach the question
of whether reckless use of force might be sufficient for liability,
though it acknowledged “that recklessness in some cases
might suffice as a standard for imposing liability.”136
Justice Scalia dissented along with Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas, arguing that the majority fundamentally mis-
read Bell because that case “makes intent to punish the focus
of its due process analysis.”137 Also, according to the dis-
senters, Kingsley did not need to use the Constitution to bring
claims against the officers since state statutory law and com-
mon law allowed him to bring a tort claim, and “the majority
overlook[ed] this in its tender-hearted desire to tortify the
Fourteenth Amendment.”138
The Court also decided qualified-immunity questions in a
handful of Section 1983 civil-rights cases. The justices were
poised to decide whether the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) required police officers to provide accommodations to
an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect when attempting to
bring her into custody. Instead, the Court resolved City and
County of San Francisco v. Sheehan139 on more narrow grounds,














140. The Court granted certiorari to decide whether the ADA applies
to an officer’s on-the-street encounter. However, in its merits
brief, San Francisco shifted its legal strategy and instead argued
that the ADA applies but that Sheehan was not due an accom-
modation. As this was not briefed below, the Court dismissed the
question as improvidently granted. Id. at 1773-74. Justices Scalia
and Kagan would have dismissed the entire case to “not reward
such bait-and-switch tactics.” Id. at 1778, 1779 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). 
141. Id. at 1777.
142. 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014) (per curiam).
143. 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (per curiam).
144. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
145. 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2273 (2015).
146. Id. at 2275.
147. Id. at 2275-76.
148. Id. at 2276.
149. Id. at 2276-77.
150. Id. at 2277 (citation omitted). 
151. Id. at 2278-79. 
152. Id. at 2281.
153. Id. at 2283, 2283 (Thomas, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Scalia and Alito). In a part of the dissent joined only
by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas compares the horrific facts of
Brumfield’s crimes with the exemplary life of Warrick Dunn, the
son of Brumfield’s victim, who overcame the murder of his
mother to become a professional football player and philan-
thropist. Id. at 2286-87.
154. Id. at 2290, 2296-97. 
granting qualified immunity to officers who confronted, shot,
and injured a mentally ill woman wielding a knife in her pri-
vate room.140 No precedent clearly established that there was
not an objective need for the officers to enter Sheehan’s
room.141 In two per curiam decisions, Carroll v. Carman142 and
Taylor v. Barkes,143 the Court granted certiorari and summarily
reversed, finding that officials were entitled to qualified immu-
nity because they did not violate rights that were clearly estab-
lished by Supreme Court or circuit precedent. Carroll holds
that officers who approach property owners (for a “knock and
talk”) at their backyard door instead of their front door do not
violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Taylor
finds that as of 2004, there was no clearly established principle
in Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent assuring an
incarcerated person’s right to proper implementation of ade-
quate suicide-prevention protocols.
HABEAS CORPUS
Last Term gave us several decisions addressing the stan-
dards to be applied in federal habeas proceedings. The most
significant of the decisions was in a case brought by a capital
defendant with intellectual deficits who claimed that he could
not be constitutionally executed under Atkins v. Virginia144 and
whose claim was summarily dismissed in state court.
In Brumfield v. Cain,145 the petitioner had based his Atkins
argument on mitigation evidence from the sentencing phase of
his trial, including his IQ score of 75, his fourth-grade reading
level, the identification of his learning disability, and his treat-
ment at psychiatric hospitals as a child. The state trial court
dismissed the Atkins claim without an evidentiary hearing and
without providing funds for further investigation, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.146 On federal habeas cor-
pus, the district court ruled that Brumfield could overcome the
deferential habeas standards established under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d): the state courts’ rejection of the claim did not com-
port with clearly established federal law and was based on an
unreasonable determination of facts. Following a federal evi-
dentiary hearing, the court went on to find that Brumfield was
intellectually disabled and therefore could not be executed.147
The Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that Brumfield could
not pass through the deferential habeas standards.148
The five-justice majority determined that the state court’s
ruling was based on an “unreasonable determination of the
facts” under § 2254(d)(2) with-
out answering the question of
whether the state court unrea-
sonably applied “clearly estab-
lished Federal law” under 
§ 2254(d)(1). The opinion,
authored by Justice Sotomayor,
focused on two factual determi-
nations made by the state trial
court—that Brumfield’s IQ indi-
cated he did not have an intellec-
tual disability and that there was
no evidence of adaptive impairment.149 The majority gave sub-
stantial deference to the trial court, noting that “[w]e may not
characterize these state-court factual determinations as unrea-
sonable ‘merely because [we] would have reached a different
conclusion . . . .’”150 Even so, Brumfield’s IQ was “squarely in
the range of potential intellectual disability,” and there was
“sufficient evidence to raise a question” as to whether Brum-
field met the criteria for adaptive impairment, so the factual
findings of the state court were unreasonable.151 The majority
emphasized that the threshold that needed to be overcome by
Brumfield for an evidentiary hearing was low; all he needed to
do was raise a “reasonable doubt” that he had an intellectual
disability.152 The Court remanded for further proceedings,
which presumably would permit the Court of Appeals to
review the finding that Brumfield was in fact intellectually dis-
abled.
Justice Thomas dissented. The dissenting and majority
opinions provide “a study in contrasts,” much like the stories
around which the dissent was framed.153 The dissent accuses
the majority of “recasting legal determinations as factual ones”
and would find that the state court’s factual determinations
were reasonable under § 2254(d)(1) and that the decision was
not an unreasonable application of clearly established law
relating to funding to develop an Atkins claim.154
Atkins itself left it to state courts to determine how to imple-
ment its constitutional rule. Brumfield may offer a bit more
guidance, particularly with respect to whether an Atkins claim
may be summarily denied or may deserve further develop-
ment. But moving forward, state courts should remain cau-
tious when looking to that guidance because it is specific to the
“reasonable doubt” standard for a defendant to get an Atkins









155. One outlier: Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015), was a
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hearing in Louisiana, and the Court did not discuss differences
among the states in standards relating to Atkins claims.
As in other recent terms, the justices also summarily
reversed several lower federal courts in habeas corpus cases.
Most of these decisions were issued to reinforce the highly def-
erential standards applied under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).155 Thus, in Lopez v.
Smith,156 the very first ruling of the Term, the Court empha-
sized that federal courts of appeals cannot rely on their own
precedent to determine whether a constitutional principle is
“clearly established” under AEDPA; only Supreme Court
precedent may do so.157 Drawing on Smith, Glebe v. Frost158
holds that a trial court’s restriction on defense counsel’s closing
argument was not “clearly established” as structural error; the
Washington Supreme Court had found the error to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  And in Woods v. Donald,159 the jus-
tices determined that the law was not “clearly established” by
United States v. Cronic160 that defense counsel’s absence from a
short portion of trial relating to a co-defendant amounted to
ineffective assistance for which prejudice would be presumed.
A LOOK AHEAD
The 2015 Term has just begun, but it already has a signifi-
cant criminal docket, including a substantial number of capi-
tal cases. Three cases argued in October raise questions about
how capital juries are instructed with respect to mitigating cir-
cumstances and whether conducting joint penalty-phase trials
of co-defendants violates the Eighth Amendment by creating a
substantial risk that the death penalty will be imposed arbi-
trarily.161 October also saw a broad challenge to Florida’s death-
penalty scheme, based on a claim that Florida’s advisory jury
fails to require a jury finding on all facts necessary to impose
the death penalty.162 The Court is taking on a Batson claim in a
capital case.163 And it will decide another death-penalty case
where it is alleged that the presiding chief justice of the state
supreme court had personally approved the capital charges
during his prior service as district attorney, had—during his
election campaign—expressed support for the death penalty in
this and other cases, and had then declined to recuse himself
from sitting in the petitioner’s case.164 On the non-capital side,
the justices are considering whether the ban on mandatory
imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, set
out in Miller v. Alabama,165 applies retroactively,166 and if
restraining a defendant’s untainted assets needed to retain
counsel violates the right to counsel and the Due Process
Clause.167 It is shaping up to be an interesting term. 
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